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Mixed Systems and Interplay. 
Norbert Wiener meets Walter Benjamin
Francesco Restuccia
Norbert Wiener, the American mathematician (1894-1964), and Walter 
Benjamin, the German philosopher (1892-1940), never met and probably 
never heard of each other. However, their thoughts about the interaction 
between human beings and machines have a few interesting similarities. They 
are both concerned with the impact of technology on society1 and they con-
sider the second industrial revolution the turning point in the evolution of 
the relationship between human and machine.
However, they followed different routes and had different goals. Wiener 
approached technology from the perspective of control engineering theory 
and only after World War II started questioning it from an ethical point of 
view. Benjamin never studied any particular machine and only approached 
technology from an “anthropological” perspective, considering especially the 
way human beings deal with their own production, including crafts and art 
(techne). The viewpoints Wiener and Benjamin share are not many; yet they 
are significant for anyone wishing to work on these issues in an interdisci-
plinary way.
The turning point
In The Human Use of Human Beings, his first book about the ethical and 
sociological implications of cybernetics and technology, Norbert Wiener 
distinguishes «the older machines, and in particular the older attempts to 
produce automata», from the «modern automatic machines such as the con-
trolled missile» (Wiener 1950, p. 22). The former functioned «on a closed 
clockwork basis» and did not have any interaction with the environment. The 
latter possess sense organs, which enable them to receive messages from, and 
interact with, the environment. If the engine is the essential element of the 
1 The social implications of cybernetics are evident also in its etymology: the term, that Wiener 
himself proposed, is based on the Greek word kybernétes (steersman, captain), which is related to 
the Latin word gubernum (government).
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first industrial revolution, substituting the labor of slaves and animals with 
the energy of the machine, the second industrial revolution can find its icon 
in the photoelectric cell (ibidem, p. 23). A few pages further Wiener describes 
these new machines through two general features:
One is that they are machines to perform some definite task or tasks, and there-
fore must possess effector organs (analogous to arms and legs in human beings) 
with which such tasks can be performed. The second point is that they must be 
en rapport with the outer world by sense organs, such as photoelectric cells and 
thermometers, which not only tell them what the existing circumstances are, 
but enable them to record the performance or nonperformance of their own 
tasks. This last function, as we have seen, is called feedback, the property of being 
able to adjust future conduct by past performance (ibidem, pp. 32-33).
The automata – the older machines – only execute what they are pro-
grammed for and they need humans to regularly adjust their functioning. On 
the contrary, machines provided with self-regulation systems – modern ma-
chines – are not only more efficient, but more autonomous: one can now be 
surprised by the performances of a machine such as a chess-player computer.
A similar distinction between a dependent and an autonomous technolo-
gy can be found in Walter Benjamin’s well-known essay The Work of Art in the 
Age of Its Technological Reproducibility (1936). This essay is much more than a 
reflection on art; Benjamin thinks anew about the way technology transforms 
our experience of the world. Even though human life has always been some-
how technical, two kinds of technology can be recognized, according to the 
sort of interaction they establish with human beings: an older one based on 
mastery over nature, and a second one based on interplay.
Whereas the former made the maximum possible use of human beings, the 
latter reduces their use to the minimum. The achievements of the first tech-
nology might be said to culminate in human sacrifice; those of the second, in 
the remote-controlled aircraft which needs no human crew. The results of the 
first technology are valid once and for all (it deals with irreparable lapse or 
sacrificial death, which holds good for eternity). The results of the second are 
wholly provisional (it operates by means of experiments and endlessly varied 
test procedures) (Benjamin 2008, p. 26).
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The first technology originated in ancient times, but far from being restrict-
ed to the past, it is still present today, every time something is accomplished 
«once and for all». The second technology, on the contrary, is quite recent, 
because it needs receptors to function by itself, reducing the use of human 
beings to the minimum. Obviously, a remote-controlled aircraft is not yet 
completely autonomous, since it needs a ground control, but it is considered 
by Benjamin a first step in this direction.
It is remarkable that Wiener and Benjamin employ the same vocabulary 
in addressing this issue: they both are interested in the new machines not 
for their efficiency, but because they make a «human use of human beings» 
possible (Wiener 1950), which means reducing «their use to the minimum» 
(Benjamin 2008, p. 26). The aim of first technology is to transform nature, 
while the second technology aims at functioning within the world: the for-
mer tries to adapt nature to itself, the latter tries to adapt itself to the world.
The second technology operates by «endlessly varied test procedures», in 
an experimental way. Benjamin considers tests a distinctive feature of the way 
of living of our society, in sport, in acting performances, and in the work pro-
cess that, «especially since it has been standardized by the assembly line, daily 
generates countless mechanized tests» (ibidem, p. 30). Test performances are 
based on a process similar to a feedback effect2: the behaviour is periodically 
compared with the result to be achieved, and the success or failure of this re-
sult changes the behaviour of the performer. This is why the results of second 
technology «are wholly provisional». According to Benjamin tests confer to 
any act a playful dimension. «The origin of the second technology lies at the 
point where, by an unconscious ruse, human beings first began to distance 
themselves from nature. It lies, in other words, in play» (ibidem, p. 26).
Interplay
One uses the older machines, but one plays with the new ones. Interacting 
with the new machines has a recreational aspect that is not present in the 
clockwork-like machines, since these latter are foreseeable. The behaviour of 
the apparatus does not depend entirely on our inputs, but also on its inacces-
2 Baudrillard 1993 compares Benjamin’s concept of test performance to feedback, but unlike 
Wiener, he considers a feedback-based society a non-democratic one.
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sible internal program, and especially on the environment, and it is therefore 
partly unpredictable for the user. This potential surprise, or, as Benjamin calls 
it, «the shock effect», creates an emotional expectation and induces «height-
ened attention» (ibidem, p. 53): the one who interacts with an apparatus is 
both alert, since he is expecting a partly unpredictable result, and distracted, 
zerstreut, which in German also means entertained. The kind of interaction 
Benjamin is thinking of is not an intellectual one: he writes about a «physical 
shock effect» and «primarily tactile» distracting elements (ibidem, p. 39).
The playful aspect of the second technology is not restricted to enter-
tainment, but it also includes learning, just as children’s games have both a 
recreational and an educational dimension. Playing with the new machines, 
the user improves his «know-how» (Wiener 1950, p. 183): the interaction 
with the apparatus is a «true training ground» (Benjamin 2008, p. 41). But 
what do we learn? What do we need to be trained for? Of course, we need 
to learn how to handle the machines themselves. However, one needs to be 
trained not only to use the machines properly, but especially «to preserve 
one’s humanity in the face of the apparatus  […], for the majority of city 
dwellers, throughout the workday in offices and factories, have to relinquish 
their humanity in the face of an apparatus» (ibidem, p. 31). The loss of hu-
manity, according to both our thinkers, is due to the lack of responsibility, 
which has to be understood in the sense of capability to respond.
I have spoken of machines, but not only of machines having brains of brass and 
thews of iron. When human atoms are knit into an organization in which they 
are used, not in their full right as responsible human beings, but as cogs and 
levers and rods, it matters little that their raw material is flesh and blood. What 
is used as an element in a machine, is in fact an element in the machine (Wiener 
1950, p. 185).
Wiener, just like Benjamin, thinks that only a machine, which is able to 
adapt itself to its environment, can establish with the user a “human” inter-
action, but the user also needs to learn how to dialogue with it. The human 
being is testing the apparatus, while the apparatus is testing the human per-
formance: they are both learning from each other.
The main example of a learning apparatus, in God & Golem Inc. (Wiener 
1964), is a computer that was developed by A. L. Samuel of IBM Corpora-
tion in 1959, and that could play checkers. The computer, just like the human 
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player, improves its performances by its own experience of the actions of the 
other player (Figure 1). In this case, it is apparent that the human is not using 
the machine, as the computer is not using the human being. Use is a term that 
belongs to the first technology, while at this stage we should rather talk of 
interplay. «The first technology really sought to master nature, whereas the 
second aims rather at an interplay between nature and humanity» (Benjamin 
2008, p. 26). Zwischenspiel in German means interplay, ludic interaction, but 
it is also employed to mean an intermezzo, a musical interlude that separates 
two parts and at the same time relates them.
Figure 1. The Mechanical Turk, Von Kempelen’s fake Automaton Chess 
Player, from Racknitz 1789, quoted by Benjamin 1968, p. 253.
Mixed systems
The relationship between human and machine establishes a new unity 
that includes the two components and the environment: the camera is con-
nected to the photographer and the photographed subject, the car to the 
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driver and the street. Modern machines, according to Wiener, are «systems 
of a mixed nature, involving both human and mechanical parts» (Wiener 
1964, p. 76).
Technical apparatuses connected to an organism are usually called pros-
theses. Wiener distinguishes them into three kinds. A simple, mechanical 
substitution of a missing limb, such as a wooden leg, is the most trivial case. A 
more interesting one is the prosthesis that substitutes for muscles and dam-
aged sense organs, such as a robot hand connected to the nervous system. But 
the third example is the most important: «this type of engineering need not 
to be confined to the replacement of parts that we have lost. There is a pros-
thesis of parts which we do not have and which we never had» (ibidem). On 
our airplanes, we have the wings of an eagle, thanks to our sonars we navigate 
like dolphins. This enhancement is not only for the single individual, but also 
for groups of people and for the whole society.
In a similar way Benjamin writes that a «new, historically unique collec-
tive» is born, «which has its organs in the new technology» (Benjamin 2008, 
p. 45). To refer to the connection between this new collective and its tech-
nological organs, its prostheses of parts which it never had, Benjamin uses 
the term innervation that he borrows from Freud’s early writings. It means 
both the distribution of nerves in an animal to any of its parts and the act 
of stimulating an activity in any of its organs. This deep connection is still 
more a project than a reality, and that is why Benjamin writes about «efforts 
at innervation»: a stimulation that expects a response – a playful training 
again. «Just as a child who has learned to grasp stretches out its hand for the 
moon as it would for a ball, so humanity, in its efforts at innervation, sets its 
sights as much on currently utopian goals as on within reach» (ibidem). A 
seemingly useless gesture like stretching out one’s hand for the moon may 
actually reveal itself as a training that will eventually help learning how to 
better grasp a ball, but at the same time it reveals that one could grasp much 
more than a ball.
Dealing with apparatus also teaches them that technology will release them 
from their enslavement to the powers of the apparatus only when humanity’s 
whole constitution has adapted itself to the new productive forces which the 
second technology has set free (ibidem, pp. 26-27).
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Because this technology aims at liberating human beings from drudgery, the 
individual suddenly sees his scope for play, his field of action, immeasurably 
expanded. He does not yet know his way around this space. But already he 
registers his demands on it (ibidem, p. 45).
Benjamin offers two examples of second technology: the remote-con-
trolled aircraft and the movie camera. They both require interplay and estab-
lish together with the human being a mixed system: they expand the human 
field of action (Spielraum: a space for playing) as prosthesis of parts humans 
never had. Thanks to his new mechanical eye the human being can now ex-
tend movements with slow motion, and expand space with enlargement, dis-
closing his «optical unconscious» (ibidem, p. 37).
Figure 2. Frame of Dziga Vertov’s  Man with a Movie Camera, 1929, a 
director quoted by Benjamin 1968, p. 231.
Know-how and know-what
The more technology is automatized, the more our field of action is 
extended. Do we still need to feel responsible for a completely automatized 
technology? Does it «take over from us our need for difficult thinking»? 
Only if we believe that it thinks for us and not with us, we will make this 
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mistake. Automation is «literal-minded»: a modern apparatus will reach 
its goal with unforeseen strategies, but it will only reach that goal. «A 
goal-seeking mechanism will not necessarily seek our goals, unless we de-
sign it for that purpose» (Wiener 1964, p. 63). The unpredictable results 
of such a machine are very interesting, because they show us something we 
did not think of; however, this can also be very dangerous. That is why the 
programming of an apparatus is a very important task.
If you’re playing a war game with a certain conventional interpretation of vic-
tory, victory will be the goal at any cost, even that of the extermination of your 
own side, unless the condition of survival is explicitly contained in the defini-
tion of victory according to which you program the machine (ibidem, p. 60).
Automation should not be a way of delegating our concerns to ma-
chines; on the contrary, we should learn to use our new extended field of 
action to face these concerns in a new playful way together with the ap-
paratus. «Vital questions affecting the individual – questions of love and 
death which had been buried by the first technology – once again press for 
solutions» (Benjamin 2008, p. 45). What we should try to understand in 
our interplay with the second technology is what we want, no matter if it is 
or it is not within reach.
Our papers have been making a great deal of American “know-how” ever since 
we had the misfortune to discover the atomic bomb. There is one quality more 
important than “know-how” and we cannot accuse the United States of any 
undue amount of it. This is “know-what” by which we determine not only how 
to accomplish our purposes, but what our purposes are to be (Wiener 1950, 
p. 183).
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